Riley v. Riley : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Riley v. Riley : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall W. Richards; Richards, Caine & Allen; Attorney for Appellant.
D. Michael Nielsen; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Riley v. Riley, No. 20050386 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5763
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHNE. RILEY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
DONNA L. RILEY, Case No. 20050386-CA 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THE PETITIONER IS APPEALING FROM A FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCE IN THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS 
COUNTY, UTAH, DATED MARCH 28, 2005. THE HONORABLE 
THOMAS L. KAY PRESIDING. 
D. MICHAEL NIELSEN 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-1818 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS (4503) 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, P.C. 
2550 Washington Boulevard, St. 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)399-4191 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
H cn 
SEP 0 6 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHNE. RILEY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
DONNA L. RILEY, Case No. 20050386-CA 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THE PETITIONER IS APPEALING FROM A FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCE IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, 
DATED MARCH 28, 2005. THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY 
PRESIDING. 
D.MICHAEL NIELSEN 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)292-1818 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS (4503) 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, P.C. 
2550 Washington Boulevard, St. 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)399-4191 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 22 
ARGUMENT 25 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
AWARDED THE RESPONDENT $900 PER MONTH FOR 
ALIMONY 23 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
USED FAULT AS A BASIS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY 
FEES 29 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DID NOT AWARD THE PETITIONER ONE HALF OF THE 
RESPONDENT'S STATE RETIREMENT BENEFITS 33 
CONCLUSION 39 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 39 
ADDENDA: 
Addendum A: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH STATE CASES 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,492 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 24, 25 
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065,1067,1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 2,3,26,27 
Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887,893,894 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 33,36,37 
Childs v. Childs, 967, P.2d 942,947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 2,32 
Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716,719 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 33 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314,1317,1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 3,35 
English v. English 656 P.2d 565 P.2d 411 (Utah 1977) 24 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326,328 (Utah 1980) 29 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276,1279 n.l (Utah 1987) 36 
Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 30 
Shinkoskey v. Shinoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1011 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) 30,31 
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407,409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 2,3 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1,3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 2 
Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547,550 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 24 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431,432,433 (Utah 1982) 21,29,33 
STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 30-3-3 3,4,30 
Section 30-3-5 4,5,6,7,21,23,24 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) 1,7 
i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN E.RILEY, : 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20050386-CA 
DONNA L.RILEY, 
Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Petitioner is appealing from a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce in the Second District Court for Davis County, Utah, dated 
March 28, 2005. The Honorable Thomas L. Kay following a bench trial made the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
AWARDED THE RESPONDENT $900 PER MONTH FOR 
ALIMONY? 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review, with no deference given to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. "While the trial court's findings of fact in divorce appeals are 
reviewed under the 'clearly erroneous standard,' its conclusions of law 'are 
reviewed for correctness and given no special deference on appeal.'" Bingham 
v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting, Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If a trial court has considered the 
appropriate factors an appellate court "will not disturb the trial court's alimony 
award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
USED FAULT AS A BASIS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES? 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
"The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in 
the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the trial court must base the 
award on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's 
ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Childs v. Childs, 
967, P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The trial court's legal conclusions 
should be reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court. See, 
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID 
NOT AWARD THE PETITIONER ONE HALF OF THE 
RESPONDENT'S RETIREMENT BENEFITS? 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review, with no deference given to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. "While the trial court's findings of fact in divorce appeals are 
reviewed under the 'clearly erroneous standard,' its conclusions of law 'are 
reviewed for correctness and given no special deference on appeal.'" Bingham 
v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting, Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "We will not disturb a trial court's 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear weight of 
evidence, or unless we reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A.§ 30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary 
alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney 
fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable 
the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision 
for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and 
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees 
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against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the 
reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide 
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other 
party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or 
judgment. 
U.C.A. §30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court 
shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring 
the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care 
insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, 
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the 
parties1 separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 
11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are 
appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. 
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(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new 
orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children bom 
to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the 
decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of 
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider 
the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or 
visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer 
to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this 
chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the 
court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended 
against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a 
visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a 
visitation or 
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to 
the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred 
by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the 
payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or 
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allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at 
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection 
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles 
and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the 
time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties1 respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, 
that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining 
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or bom during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and 
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, 
unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor 
may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share 
living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds 
that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years 
that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period 
of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the 
court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon 
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the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are 
determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse 
is cohabitating with another person 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(h) Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 18, 2003, the Petitioner filed a pro se Verified Petition for divorce. 
(R. 1-5). On July 16, 2003, the Respondent filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 
6-13). On August 20, 2003, a temporary stipulation was filed with the court that 
was signed by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. As part of the stipulation, 
the Respondent was awarded possession of the marital home. The parties agreed 
that it would be sold. The Petitioner received a 2001 Ford Mustang. As part of the 
stipulation he was to assume the loan on it and refinance it so the Respondent's 
name was no longer associated with the automobile. The Respondent received two 
vehicles. A 1969 Ford Mustang and a 1990 Subaru. Both of these vehicles were 
paid for. The Petitioner also agreed to pay nine hundred dollars a month ($900) to 
the Respondent for household expenses. (R. 18-20). 
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The case eventually went to trial on January 24, 2005, and a divorce was 
granted. As part of the decree of divorce, the Petitioner was ordered to pay 
alimony in the amount of $900.00 a month. Each party was awarded their own 
401(k) accounts. However, the Respondent was allowed to keep all of her defined 
state retirement assets. The parties each owed approximately $14,000 to the first 
and second mortgage holders from the sale of the marital home. The Court did not 
make any changes in the debt allocation. The Petitioner was ordered to pay the 
Respondent $5,100 that he had received from a recent employment contract 
dispute for back wages. The Petitioner was also ordered to pay five thousand 
dollars ($5,000) towards the Respondent's attorney fees. (R. 272-277). The 
divorce decree was signed on March 28, 2004. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were signed on the same day. (R. 257-271). A notice of 
Appeal was timely filed on April 25, 2004. (R. 288). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on February 1, 1992, in Fairbanks, Alaska. (R. 
298/2-3) The Petitioner was in the Army and was stationed at Fort Wainwright in 
Fairbanks. He had been in the army for over fifteen years. The Respondent lived 
in Sitka, Alaska. Sitka is approximately 680 miles south of Fairbanks. The 
Respondent worked for the State of Alaska. (R. 298/3). 
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When they married, the Respondent tried to find employment in Fairbanks 
but was unsuccessful. She requested that the Petitioner leave the Army and move 
to Sitka. The Petitioner used the Army's weight control program to leave the 
Army. For the first two months of the marriage the Petitioner lived in Fairbanks, 
and the Respondent lived in Sitka. (R. 298/3-5). The Petitioner was honorably 
discharged from the Army and moved to Sitka to be with the Respondent. (R. 
298/5-6). 
The reason the Petitioner relocated to Sitka was because the Respondent 
made approximately $50,000 a year working for the State of Alaska and the 
Petitioner earned approximately $17,000 a year from the Army. (R. 298/62). 
Although the Petitioner testified that he was not very happy in the Army he would 
have stayed in the Army for four more years until he could retire. (R. 298/59-60). 
The Petitioner received approximately $15,000.00 in severance pay, which 
he contributed to his new family. (R. 298/6, 155-56). The Petitioner did not 
receive a retirement because he left the Army before his twenty-year mark. He 
needed to serve an additional four years and four months before he was eligible for 
military retirement. (R. 298/6). The Petitioner testified that if he had remained in 
the military his retirement would have been approximately $1000 a month and he 
estimated that leaving the military early had already cost him approximately one 
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hundred thousand dollars. (R. 298/192). This military retirement would have 
lasted for the rest of his life. (R. 298/192). 
The Petitioner had a difficult time finding work in Sitka. It was a small 
town with eight thousand people and the main employer in the town shut down. 
He sold real estate and took odd jobs. (R. 298/7, 154). The Respondent had two 
young children (8 and 6) and the Petitioner had custody of his son. The decision 
was made that initially the Petitioner would take care of the kids while the 
Respondent worked. (R. 298/154). 
They lived together in Sitka together for just over two years when they 
decided to relocate to Utah. (R.298/7). They moved to Utah because the 
Respondent found a job with the State of Utah and the Petitioner wanted to go to 
school. (R. 298/7-8). They moved to Kaysville in July of 1994. In November of 
1996, they purchased a home in Kaysville. (R. 298/15). The Respondent picked 
out the home and decided to buy it. The Petitioner went along with her decision 
and "signed the mortgage papers." (R. 298/162). The Respondent worked for the 
State of Utah. The Petitioner attended school and worked part-time at JC Penny's 
and then as a flight instructor. (R. 298/9) 
The Petitioner went to school from September of 1994 until August of 1997 
when he graduated from Westminster with a bachelor's degree in aviation 
management. (R. 298/9). The Veteran's Administration ("VA") paid for all of the 
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Petitioner's schooling. The VA also gave the Petitioner $796 a month for living 
expenses. (R. 298/10, 161). The Petitioner also worked as a flight instructor while 
he was in school. (R. 298/10). 
After graduation the Petitioner worked full-time as a flight instructor. (R. 
298/11). While the Petitioner was attending school, the Respondent also attended 
school and obtained a master's degree from Southeastern University. (R. 298/12). 
Upon completion of her master's degree, the Respondent obtained a job as the 
Associate Regional Director for the Division of Child and Family Services 
("DCFS"). (R. 298/12). 
In January of 1999, the Petitioner began working as a pilot for Express Jet 
Airlines. (R. 298/12-13). At the time of the trial, the Petitioner was a captain, 
which is as high of a position as he is able to hold. (R. 298/13). 
In May of 1999, the Petitioner had an extra-marital affair. As a result of this 
affair a son was born. (R. 298/17). The son was born on February 4, 2000 in 
Houston, Texas. (R. /17-18). The Petitioner didn't tell the Respondent about the 
affair or the child. (R. 298/18). The Respondent discovered that the Petitioner had 
a child in April, 2001, when she opened a letter to the Petitioner from the State of 
Texas.(R.298//18). 
The Petitioner was no longer involved with the child's mother. The 
discovery of the illegitimate child caused marital problems but it didn't cause the 
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parties to terminate the marriage at that time. (R. 298/19). They attended 
marriage counseling and normal marital relations continued. (R. 298/20). 
One of the conditions of the parties remaining together was that the 
Petitioner was to have no contact with either his son or his son's mother. (R. 
298/20, 164-65). The Petitioner paid child support but he didn't have any contact 
with his son. (R. 298/21). In the spring of 2003, the Petitioner asked the 
Respondent what she would do if something happened to his mother. The 
Respondent told him that he'd have to give up his parental rights. (R. 298/21). 
This bothered him and the Petitioner decided that he was going to leave the 
marriage. (R. 298/22). 
During the trial, the Petitioner was cross-examined about a second child he 
may have fathered at about the same time he and the Respondent separated. He 
initially denied that he was the father of the child. However, he eventually 
acknowledged that he is involved with the child's mother and that the child is 
covered by his medical insurance. (R. 298/68-78). 
On May 31, 2003, the Petitioner moved out of the marital home and 
relocated in Houston, Texas. He moved into a two-bedroom apartment that was 
shared by seven other pilots who used it when they had layovers in Houston. (R. 
298/23). When the Petitioner moved out, he agreed to pay the Respondent nine 
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hundred dollars ($900) each month until the house was sold. (R. 298/24). The 
house sold December 1, 2004. 
When the Petitioner began working for Express Jet Airlines in 1999, he 
made $18.16 an hour. (R. 298/26). Pilots do not have a traditional forty-hour 
workweek. They are limited by federal regulations to a maximum of one hundred 
(100) flight hours a month and one thousand (1000) flight hours in a year. (R. 
298/26). These hours do not represent the total hours worked, only the amount of 
actual flight time from when the door closes until the plane lands. (R. 298/32) 
The Petitioner receives a guarantee that he will receive seventy-five (75) hours per 
month. (R. 298/27). His annual income was based on a seventy-five hour month. 
(R. 298/27). 
At the time of trial, the Petitioner's hourly income had increased to $67.72 
an hour. (R. 298/28). His union had been involved in twenty-six months of 
contract negotiations and he had recently received a 9.8 percent raise. (R. 298/28). 
As part of the contract resolution, the Petitioner received retro pay in the amount of 
$16,767.20. That amount represented a pay increase for the past twenty-six 
months that the contract was in dispute. (R. 298/30). For the year 2004, the 
Petitioner's W-2 showed income in the amount of $82,193.19. Included in this 
amount was the $16,767.20 of retroactive pay. (R. 298/32). Under the contract, 
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the Petitioner will receive a three percent cost of living increase for the next four 
years. (R. 298/35) 
If the Petitioner was to fly the maximum one thousand hours allowed by 
federal law, he would have an annual income of $67,720.00. (R. 298/33). He's 
only guaranteed 75 flight hours a month, but he has been receiving over-time hours 
and anticipates that he will continue to work overtime. (R. 298/33). 
Under federal law, the Petitioner can only work as a commercial airline pilot 
for approximately twelve more years. There is mandatory retirement for 
commercial pilots once they turn sixty (60). (R. 298/35-6). The Petitioner's 
company does not have a pension plan. He does have a 401(k) plan where the 
company matches up to six percent. At the time of trial, the Petitioner had 
$21,858.75 in his 401(k) account, with a loan against it in the amount of $5,711.84. 
(R. 298/37). 
The Petitioner also receives VA disability. At the time of the trial he was 
receiving approximately $400 a month. He expected that amount to reduce to 
approximately $270 a month once the divorce became final. (R. 298/38). 
At the time of the trial, the Petitioner's child in Texas was four years old. (R. 
298/39). The Petitioner is ordered to pay four hundred and seventy dollars a month 
in child support. ($470.00) (R. 298/40). His son has had a hearing loss and he is 
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in speech therapy and attends special schooling. The Petitioner's monthly cost for 
the schooling is $156.11. (R. 298/40). 
After the parties' home in Kaysville sold, the Petitioner purchased a 
townhouse in Houston. He paid $119,900 for it. His mortgage payment is 
$1,165.00 a month. That includes property taxes and insurance. (R. 298/42). 
The Petitioner calculated his estimated gross income to be $61,056. This 
was based on his expectation to work at least ten over-time hours a month and his 
VA disability. (R. 298/44). The Petitioner did testify that a best case scenario for 
him would be to earn $67,720 in salary. This would be receiving the maximum 
one thousand flight hours allowed under federal law at $67.72 an hour. (R. 298/33-
34). 
On cross examination, Respondent's attorney pointed out that Petitioner 
earned $68,700 in 2004. (R. 298/80). That resulted in gross income of $5,666.00 a 
month. With an additional $414 in VA pay the total increased to a gross income 
$6,070 a month. (R. 298/81). This represented a lot of overtime that was worked 
in 2004. (R. 298/81). The Respondent's attorney also pointed out that he had a 
10% increase in pay which would result in him making $6,232.00 a month. The 
Petitioner answered that this was possible. (R. 298/109). 
In addition to his income the Petitioner receives a per diem. This is not 
taxed and he is paid $1.60 an hour. In 2004, he received approximately $4,000 in 
15 
per diem. (R. 298/80). The per diem is to reimburse the Petitioner for food and 
expenses while he is away from home. While he is on the road he stays in hotels 
and eats at restaurants. The per diem covers the expenses associated with having 
to eat all of his meals in restaurants while he is traveling. (R. 298/99-100) 
The Petitioner submitted an exhibit, which listed his monthly deductions and 
expenses.(R.296/Petitioner's Financial Statement/Exhibit Number 13). They 
included, but were not limited to, $770.00 in federal taxes, (R. 298/44) One 
hundred and fifty dollars for the 401(k) loan payment, $1,165.00 for his house 
payment, a car payment of $575.00 each month. (R. 298/45-46). The Petitioner 
also had a number of credit card debts. (R. 298/51-52). 
The Respondent testified at the trial. She testified that when they met the 
Petitioner was in the military and that he was not happy in the military. (R. 
298/116-17). She testified that they decided that they wanted to get married and 
they wanted to live in the same town. (R. 298/117). When asked whether he 
would have left the military absent their marriage, she answered that she didn't 
know. (R. 298/117). The Respondent testified that the family moved to Utah so 
the Petitioner could pursue his aviation training. (R. 298/118-19). 
During the course of the marriage, the parties routinely accumulated large 
debt and then would find ways to pay it off. On several occasions the Respondent 
drew out her retirement benefits to pay bills. They also re-financed their home, 
took out a second mortgage, maxed out credit cards and borrowed against their 
401(k)'s. This trend of maxing out credit cards and borrowing against their 
401(k)'s continued even after the parties separated. (R. 298/175-176). 
During the marriage the Respondent withdrew some of her retirement 
benefits. On September 12, 1994 she withdrew $38,863.29 from the State of 
Alaska Benefits Annuity Plan. An accountant testified at trial that if that money 
would have been left in the same fund it would have a current balance of 
$92,993.53. (R. 298/125). The Respondent also withdrew $6,824.26 from the 
Utah State Retirement System. The accountant testified that the account would 
have been worth $8,266.89 if had been left alone. (R. 298/126). On February 11, 
2000, the Respondent withdrew $18,226 from the State of Alaska Benefit Plan. 
The accountant testified that that plan would have had a value of $22,752.49 if she 
had left it alone. (R. 298/126). The total estimated of what those three 
distributions would have been worth had they not been withdrawn was 
$124,012.91. (R. 298/126). 
When the marital home was sold the parties owed approximately $28,000 
more to the first and second mortgage than what they sold it for. Each party took 
an unsecured loan to pay off the balance and each owed approximately $14,000 
from the home. (R. 298/140). 
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The Respondent had $23,000 in a 401(k) account. (R. 298/139). There was 
a loan against half of it. Her mortgage payment was $1,100 (R. 145). Her food 
and household supplies were estimated at $393 (R. 146) Her monthly expenses 
were estimated at $4,491 including $400 a month in legal fees. (See, also, R. 
296/Respondent's monthly expenses). 
The Respondent also had a side business. In 2003, she earned an additional 
$6,425.00. (R. 298/168). However, on her taxes she was able to show expenses of 
$4,700. She had an office expense of $1,032.00 that was for her office in her 
home. This "office" is a room in her home that is used for other purposes and is 
not an actual expense. (R. 298/169-171). She also depreciated $423.00 from her 
business, for her desk, computer and printer. She also uses those items for non 
business purposes. (R. 298/169-170). In 2004, she earned an additional $2,000 for 
teaching at the University of Phoenix. (R. 298/171). She also conducted twelve 
home studies and earned $375 for each home study. (R. 298/172). The trial court 
did not count as income her income from the home studies or her teaching at the 
University of Phoenix. (R. 262). 
The Court had the attorneys for both parties proffer information on their 
fees. The Petitioner's attorney indicated that his fee was $150 an hour and that the 
Petitioner had paid $5,000 up to that point and that after trial the amount would be 
18 
around $7,000. (R. 298/194). The Respondent's attorney fees were $10,400. (R. 
298/194). 
In the trial court's Finding of Facts, the court found that the Petitioner was 
not credible. The trial judge believed that he had either fathered a second child out 
of wedlock or defrauded an insurance company and that he has signed an affidavit 
to buy a home stating that he was single. (R. 258). The Court found that the issues 
that had to be decided rested heavily on its assessment of credibility. (R. 259). 
The Court found that in March 1992, the Petitioner left the military. The 
Court acknowledged that the parties presented conflicting evidence as to the reason 
for the cessation of employment with the military. The Court found that regardless 
of the reasons, the Petitioner benefited in his personal happiness and his career 
opportunities by leaving the military and becoming a commercial pilot. (R. 259-60) 
The Court found that in order to facilitate the Petitioner's education, the 
Respondent's pre-marital assets were liquidated and the funds were used for family 
expenses. And that if those funds had been left in the retirement accounts the value 
today would be $124,012.91. (R. 260). The Court also found that during the 
course of the marriage, the Respondent earned and contributed approximately 
$275,000 to $300,000, more than the Petitioner. (R. 261). 
As to current income, the Court found that the Petitioner's monthly gross 
income was $6,800.00. (R. 261). The Court came to this figure by giving him an 
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expected gross taxable income of $6,232.00 a month. (R. 261) This would result 
in an annual income of $74,784. The Court also added $414.00 a month from the 
VA and noted that the Petitioner receives three to four hundred dollars a month in 
per diem. Considering all of the above the Court found that his gross monthly 
income was $6,800. (R. 261). The Court found that the Respondent's gross 
monthly income was $4,153.00. The Court did not include as income the money 
Respondent makes from teaching at the University of Phoenix or the money she 
receives from doing home studies. (R. 262). 
The Court further found that the Respondent's monthly expenses were 
$4,491.00 per month and that her present ability to meet those needs is $4,153.00. 
(R. 262). The Court found that the Petitioner set forth his expenses at $4,655.00. 
The Court found that the Petitioner still had over $2,000 left over each month, 
giving him the ability to assist the Respondent. The Court further found that some 
of his claimed expenses were inflated. (R. 263). What the Court didn't 
acknowledge was that the Respondent had listed $1,565.00 in deductions. These 
included, federal taxes, social security, medicare, union dues, other (which 
included dental, medical and life insurance) and a 401(k) loan payment. (See, R. 
296/Petitioner's Financial Statement). Petitioner's attorney attempted to inform 
the Court that the Petitioner had two columns, one for deductions and one for 
expenses and that the $4,655.00 figure didn't include deductions. The Court 
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appeared to disregard this and did not consider it as it related to the Petitioner's 
expenses. (R. 298/243-44). 
The Court placed emphasis on the issue of fault as recognized and permitted 
by the legislature in U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(b). The Court based its finding of fault on 
the following facts. (1) During the course of the marriage the Petitioner 
committed adultery and fathered a child in the State of Texas. (2) The Petitioner 
hid this from the Respondent for almost two years. During that time the Petitioner 
paid child support without the Respondent's knowledge. (3) The Respondent 
found out about the adultery and child when she opened mail at the family 
residence and discovered an order from the State of Texas regarding issues of 
paternity and child support. (4) These facts constituted grounds of extreme mental 
anguish and distress. (5) It appeared that the Petitioner had fathered a second child 
outside the marriage. The Petitioner was evasive and deceitful concerning the 
second child. (R. 263-64). 
The Court ordered that each party was to keep their 401(k) accounts, free 
from any claim by the other. The Court refused to divide the Respondent's State 
of Utah retirement assets pursuant to the Woodward formula. (R. 267). The Court 
ordered the Petitioner to pay $5,000 of the Respondent's attorney fees. The Court 
made a finding that the Petitioner didn't have the immediate ability to pay attorney 
fees. However, the Court found that he had the ability to pay, that the Respondent 
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had the need and that combined with the fault in the case, the Petitioner was 
ordered to pay $5,000 of her $10,500.00 worth of attorney fees. (R. 268-69). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion in three specific areas. First, the trial 
court awarded $900.00 in alimony when the Respondent did not have the need for 
that alimony and the Petitioner did not have the ability to pay the alimony. The 
court found that the Petitioner had and extra $2000.00 to pay towards alimony. 
This finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The Court failed to recognize the 
Petitioner's deductions in the amount of $1565.00, even though Petitioner's 
attorney alerted the court to its error. The Court also abused its discretion by 
calculating the Petitioner's per diem as income while refusing to add as income the 
Respondent's money she earned from teaching and doing home studies. 
The second order the Petitioner appeals from is the trial court's award of 
attorney fees. An award of attorney fees must be based on evidence of the 
receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees. In this case, the trial court awarded attorney 
fees based on the Petitioner's fault. The trial court also found that the Petitioner 
had the ability to pay attorney fees and the Respondent had the financial need. 
This finding was also clearly erroneous, especially after the court had ordered the 
Petitioner to pay $900.00 per month in alimony. 
22 
The final issue on appeal concerns the court's inequitable division of the 
Respondent's retirement assets. Generally, retirement benefits are subject to 
equitable distribution unless the court enters detailed findings stating exceptional 
circumstances that support an inequitable distribution. The court abused its 
discretion when it awarded the Respondent her entire State retirement benefits free 
and clear from any claim by the Petitioner. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
AWARDED THE RESPONDENT $900 PER MONTH FOR 
ALIMONY. 
U.C.A. §30-3-5 sets out several factors that a court must consider when 
determining alimony. They are (1) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; (2) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; (4) the length of the 
marriage; (5) whether the recipient has custody of minor children requiring 
support; (6) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and (7) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to 
any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the 
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
See, U.C.A. 30-3-5(8)(a)(2004). 
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The Court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
U.C.A. 30-3-5(8)(b). The Court should also look to the standard of living existing 
at the time of separation to determine alimony. However, the court can base 
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. U.C.A. 30-3-
5(8)(c). 
In this case, the trial court found that the Respondent had a need of alimony 
and that the Petitioner had the ability to pay alimony. The trial court also 
considered the Petitioner's fault when it awarded alimony. The Petitioner 
challenges the trial court's findings on both his ability to pay and the Respondent's 
need for alimony. 
The well settled standard for setting traditional alimony has been articulated 
by the Utah Supreme Court as follows. "The most important function of alimony 
is to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public 
charge." English v. English 656 P.2d 565 P.2d 411 (Utah 1977). 
In Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court stated that 
"[w]e will not overturn a trial court's alimony ruling as long as the court supports 
its ruling with adequate findings and exercises its discretion according to the 
standards we have set." Id. at 550. In Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), this Court reiterated that there are three factors a court must consider in 
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fixing a reasonable alimony award. They are (1) the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife, (2) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, 
and (3) the ability of the husband to provide support. Id. at 492. 
Failure to consider these factors in fashioning an alimony award constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings of 
fact on each factor to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was 
rationally based upon those factors. Id. If sufficient findings are not made, this 
Court "must reverse unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as to allow 
us to apply the Jones factors as a matter of law on appeal." Id. 
In awarding alimony to the Respondent, the trial court did not give her credit 
for earning an extra $2,000 from teaching for the University of Phoenix nor an 
additional $4,500 she earned from doing home studies. Failure to include this 
income was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. If these amounts had been 
included, her monthly income would have been $4,694.66. 
The Court found that the Respondent's exhibit sets forth her expenses as 
$4,491.00 per month. (R. 262). Part of her expenses was for attorney fees in the 
amount of $400 a month. There was no evidence presented as to how much she 
had paid or as to how much longer this payment would last. Furthermore, the trial 
court took the Petitioner's exhibit at face value while criticizing the Petitioner's 
expenses as being inflated. Of interesting note, which further evidences an abuse 
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of discretion, the Court found that some of the Petitioner's expenses such as food, 
entertainment and incidentals were inflated. (R. 263). However, the Respondent 
claimed more for these same items than the Petitioner did and that amount was 
unchallenged by the trial court. The Petitioner's financial statement listed food and 
household supplies at $500, entertainment at $250, and incidentals at $100, for a 
total of $850. (R. 296/Petitioner's Financial Statement/exhibit #13). 
The Respondent listed her food and household supplies at $393, 
entertainment at $120, and incidentals at $370, for a total of $883. (R. 
296/Respondent's Monthly expenses/exhibit #4). 
In Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) this Court 
addressed a situation where a trial court awarded the wife more money in alimony 
than her monthly expenses required. The trial court awarded a total monthly 
payment of $3,181.76 between child support and alimony. The wife had estimated 
that her monthly expenses after the divorce would be $3,080. The trial court 
deleted $600 of the wife's estimated expenses because she was given the family 
home free and clear of any mortgage. The trial court awarded her $701.76 per 
month more than her projected financial requirements. This Court stated that 
"[w]here the trial court has offered no explanation for such a discrepancy, we agree 
with defendant that the court should not have awarded plaintiff more than her 
established needs required, regardless of defendant's ability to pay this excess 
amount." Id. at 1068. 
In the case at bar, the trial court based the high alimony award on 
Petitioner's fault and on the fact that the Respondent had sacrificed in order to help 
Petitioner further his career and had contributed more money to the marriage than 
the Petitioner had. While it is true that the Court may consider fault it can only do 
so after addressing the musts in the statute. The Court "must" find that the 
Respondent has a need for alimony and that the Petitioner had the ability to pay. It 
is only after both of these findings are met that the trial court can consider the fault 
of one of the parties. As has already been shown the Respondent did not have a 
"need" for alimony. When her teaching and home study money is added in she 
earns in excess of her expenses. This is especially so when the $400 a month in 
attorney fees is eliminated from her expenses. Again, there was no testimony as to 
how much she had paid or for how long this expense would last. However, based 
on the fee that was proffered, at most this expense would last two years. 
The trial court also abused its discretion when it determined that the 
Petitioner had the ability to pay alimony. The Court improperly applied the 
Petitioner's per diem amount. The trial court added $400 a month for per diem to 
the Petitioner's income. This money is not considered income and is not taxed. It 
is in recognition of the fact the Petitioner is forced to lived out of a hotel three or 
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four days a week and it helps compensate him for restaurant expenses and 
entertainment. 
The trial court also abused its discretion by not recognizing the Petitioner's 
deductions. The Court found that the Petitioner listed his expenses at $4655.00.. 
The Court then found that the Petitioner had an extra had an extra $2000 to pay 
towards alimony. This finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The Court failed to 
recognize even after Petitioner's counsel attempted to point out that the $4,655.00 
figure did not include deductions, including federal taxes, social security, 
medicare, union dues, insurance and a 401(k) loan payment. (R. 296/Petitioner's 
exhibit #13). This amount comes to $1,565.00 and should have been deducted from 
the $2,000 figure the Court listed. When the per diem money is subtracted the 
Petitioner does not have the ability to pay any alimony. Even with the Court's 
projected gross income and adding the per diem, the Petitioner does not have the 
ability to pay the $900 that was ordered. 
It appears that the Court was attempting to punish the Petitioner for his mis-
deeds. This is evident by the following factors. (1) The court included the 
Petitioner's per diem as income and did not include the Respondent's side jobs as 
her income. (2) The court criticized the Petitioner's expenses as inflated, even 
though the Respondent's expenses for incidentals, food, household supplies and 
entertainment were more than the Petitioner's. (3) By not awarding the Petitioner 
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his Woodward portion of the Respondent's State retirement that was obtained 
during the marriage. (4) By awarding attorney fees to the Respondent. The trial 
judge manifested this intent when following his rulings he stated "I think that one 
thing is that it may teach Mr. Riley something and it may teach other people who 
want to get divorced that if they follow this same path that it may be a way to 
prevent them from doing that in the future." (R. 298/257). 
It is well-settled that "a trial court must consider many factors in making a 
property settlement in a divorce proceeding, but that the purpose of the settlement 
should not be to impose punishment on either party." Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Using property settlement to teach someone a lesson is 
an improper use of the court's discretion when it comes to dividing marital assets. 
The trial court's alimony award was not supported by adequate findings. 
Especially when it refused to consider the Petitioner's deductions when it found he 
had an extra $2000 to pay alimony with each month and when the Court did not 
acknowledge his federal and other deductions. The record is not clear and 
uncontroverted on this matter. Therefore, the alimony award should be reversed 
and remanded to the trial court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
USED FAULT AS A BASIS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
A trial court may award attorney fees and costs in a divorce proceedings. 
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See, U.C.A. § 30-3-3 (2004). However, a trial court must base it award "on 
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, 
and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Shinkoskey v. Shinoskey, 19 P.3d 
1005 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). In addition an award of attorney fees "must be based 
on sufficient findings regarding these factors." Id. (quoting Rehn v. Rehn, 91A 
P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
In the case at bar, the trial court ordered the Petitioner to pay Five thousand 
dollars in attorney fees. The trial court based this decision at least in part on the 
fault of the Petitioner. When the trial judge orally announced his decision on the 
case he stated, "You have to show that there is a need and there's an ability to pay. 
However, in this case I also believe there's the issue of fault that I believe is a 
considerable issue and I believe specifically that Mrs. Riley wouldn't have 
incurred any attorney's fees had there not been the adultery." (R. 298/246). The 
trial judge also acknowledged that the Petitioner did not have the ability to pay the 
attorney fees. He said, "I also understand that Mr. Riley does not have the ability 
if he's going to be paying $900 a month for 12 years for alimony that he can just 
write out checks for the other . . . . I believe that there is an ability to pay. I believe 
that she has a need. I also believe that combined with the fault in this case, 
attorney's fees or these other items wouldn't even had to be dealt with." (R. 
298/246-47). 
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Petitioner's attorney asked the court "[a]re you saying that the award of 
attorney's fees is based partly on fault?" The trial court answered, 
"I'm saying the attorney's fees are based on two things. One, I'm saying the 
attorney's fees would never had to been incurred had there not been adultery in this 
situation. And so if you want to say that's at fault or whatever else. On the second 
ground I'm saying that based upon the evidence I believe he has the ability to pay 
it and she has a need for it." (R. 298/248). 
In Shinkoskey, the Findings of Fact stated that "[e]ach of the parties is going 
to have difficulty in paying their attorneys fees and yet, the Court has determined 
they should be ordered to do so. To assist the Petitioner in payment of her fees, 
[t]he Court finds the Respondent should be ordered to pay $15,000.00 toward 
Petitioner's fees and costs." Shinkoskey v. Shinoskey, 19 P.3d at 1011. This Court 
found that "[t]he trial court did not make specific findings on any of the factors, 
particularly whether under the circumstances Husband had the ability to pay. The 
Trial court's factual findings are so conclusory as to preclude meaningful review." 
Id. This Court also reversed and remanded because the record did not "clearly and 
uncontrovertedly" support the award of attorney fees. Id. 
In the case at bar the trial court acknowledged that the Petitioner did not 
have the immediate ability to pay the attorney fees. Finding of Fact #31 states: 
In this case, it is also interesting to note that the Court specifically 
believes that Mrs. Riley would not have incurred any attorney fees 
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had there not been the adultery. The Court also takes into account the 
fact that Mr. Riley does not have the immediate ability to pay 
attorneys fees. Because of his alimony obligation, he will not be able 
to simply write out a significant check for attorneys fees. 
(R. 268, Finding of Fact #31). In Finding of Fact #32, the Court found that "[t]he 
Court also believes that Mrs. Riley is in need of assistance, as set forth in multiple 
findings. The Court also believes that, combined with the fault in this case, issues 
of attorneys fees, and other issues would not have arisen and had to been [sic] dealt 
with but for Mr. Riley's fault." (R. 269). 
Case law on this subject is clear that a trial court "must base the award on 
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, 
and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998)(emphasis added). 
It is clear, that the trial court based its award of attorney fees in part on fault. 
This is an abuse of discretion and there is no provision that allows the trial court to 
use fault as a basis for attorney fees in a divorce. Furthermore, as was argued 
under Point I, the Respondent did not have a need and the Petitioner does not have 
the ability to pay attorney fees. This is especially true in light of the $900 alimony 
award where the Respondent now receives more income each month than her 
needs require and the Petitioner does not have adequate means to pay all of his 
bills. For these reasons, the Respondent respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the trial court's award of attorney fees in this matter. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID 
NOT AWARD THE PETITIONER ONE HALF OF THE 
RESPONDENT'S STATE RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
In Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that pension benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the 
employer and that if the rights to those benefits "are acquired during the marriage, 
then the court must at least consider those benefits in making an equitable 
distribution of the marital assets." Id. at 432. The Court stated that the "essential 
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part 
during the marriage. To the extent that the right has so accrued it is subject to 
equitable distribution." Id. at 432-33. 
In Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), this Court stated that 
"[Retirement accounts are part of the marital estate and they are generally to be 
equitably divided." Id. at 719. In Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999) this Court stated that "[a]n unequal division of marital property . . . is 
only justified when the trial court 'memorializes in commendably detailed 
findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Id. at 894. 
The trial court awarded the Respondent her State retirement benefits free 
from any claim by the Petitioner. The Court did this "based upon the amount of 
money she gave up through conversion of her earlier retirement assets in order to 
benefit the home, the family and Mr. Riley's career." (R. 267). 
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In making this ruling the Court failed to acknowledge a number of factors. 
First, that the Petitioner paid for all of his schooling with money from the 
VA.(R.298/10, 161) Second, that while the Petitioner was working on a bachelor's 
degree, the Respondent obtained a Master's degree that enhanced her earning 
capacity. (R.298/12) Third, that the Petitioner left the military early to live with 
the Respondent after they married and gave up his military retirement. (R.298/6, 
192) Fourth, that the Petitioner contributed his severance pay to the family. 
(R.298/6, 155-56) Fifth, that although the Respondent made more money then the 
Petitioner through the course of the marriage, there were family decisions that were 
made that the Petitioner would stay at home with the kids and the main employer 
in Sitka shut down leaving minimal employment opportunities. (R.298/7, 154) 
Sixth, that the parties always lived outside of their means even after they separated. 
They would find whatever means they could to get out of debt, including 
borrowing against their 401(k)s, maxing out credit cards, they took out a second 
mortgage on the home, cashed out retirement benefits and refinanced their home. 
(R.298/175-76) Seventh, that since the Respondent made more money than the 
Petitioner she made important financial decisions such as which house to buy. 
(R.298/162) Eighth, that the Petitioner wanted to take out bankruptcy, but the 
Respondent chose to liquidate retirement assets instead. (R.298/175-76) Ninth, 
that the Petitioner does not have a pension plan with his company and will be 
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forced to retire when he turns 60 (R.298/35-36). He currently has approximately 
$23,000 in a 401(k). That is his sole retirement. Tenth, because the Petitioner is 
ordered to pay $900 in alimony over the next twelve years (which will take him to 
retirement) he will not have the ability to build up his 401(k) or savings for 
retirement. 
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. 1990), this Court reversed a trial 
court's decision to not give the wife her husband's a portion of her husband's 
retirement benefits. The only finding made by the trial court to justify the 
inequitable division that that Mrs. Dunn enjoyed a standard of living "substantially 
greater than she ever could have achieved on her own" and that Dr. Dunn achieved 
his financial success "through really no contribution of [Mrs. Dunn] other than her 
being married to him." Id. at 1320. This Court stated that "Mrs Dunn was an equal 
partner in the marriage and the distribution of all marital assets should reflect that 
fact." Id. 
When two people get married they make decisions that that will affect their 
future. In the case at bar, the parties made numerous financial decisions that were 
unwise. The Petitioner gave up his military retirement to be with the respondent 
and contributed his severance to the family. The Respondent liquidated retirement 
assets because the family couldn't live within its means. The fact still remains that 
they were equal partners in the marriage and should share in the marital assets. 
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Generally, in a divorce proceeding "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled 
to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." 
Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 893 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). A trial court may 
distribute property unequally when "the circumstances and needs of the parties 
dictate a departure from the general rule (e.g., to enable one party to fulfill an 
alimony or child support obligation)." Id. at 894. A trial court should consider 
"the relative abilities of the spouses to support themselves after the divorce . . ." 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 n.l (Utah 1987). 
In the case at bar, the Respondent has a retirement through the State 
retirement system. It has accrued during the marriage. She began employment 
with the State of Utah following the couple's decision to relocate to Utah after they 
were married. The Petitioner does not have a retirement other than his 401(k). As 
a result of the mandatory retirement age and his large alimony and child support 
orders he is not in a position where he will be able to save for retirement. 
The inequitable division of the marital asset was not supported by 
"commendably detailed findings" stating the exceptional circumstances supporting 
the distribution. The only Finding that addressed this asset directly was number 
28. It says that the award of the retirement asset was "based upon the amount of 
money she gave up through conversion of her earlier retirement assets in order to 
benefit the home, the family and Mr. Riley's career." (R. 267). This is not the 
36 
type of detailed finding to justify an inequitable distribution and fails to conform to 
the legal justifications articulated above. 
In Bradford, this Court stated that "changes will be made in a trial court's 
property division determination in a divorce action only if there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Bradford 
v. Bradford, 993 P.2d at 893. The court's property distribution has resulted in a 
serious inequity that manifests a clear abuse of discretion. For these reasons, the 
Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's distribution of 
this marital asset. 
CONCLUSION 
When the issues in this case are analyzed in their entirety, the trial judge did 
exactly what Bradford prohibits. The trial court misunderstood that it hadn't 
calculated the Petitioner's deductions when it found that the Petitioner had an extra 
$2000 each month, and thus the ability to pay alimony. The trial court misapplied 
the law when it used fault as a basis for awarding attorney fees, and its ruling 
concerning division of the retirement account resulted in a "serious inequity" that 
manifests a clear abuse of discretion. For these reasons, the Petitioner respectfully 
37 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's inequitable property division, as well 
as the alimony award and the award of attorney fees. ^ 
DATED thisQ^day of September, 2005.
 f * \ 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
counsel for the Respondent/Aippellee, D. Michael Nielsen, 505 South Main, 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 thisW>3ay of September, 2005. -
\Uj^S*huJj- /M,r ; i M ^ ) 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILED 
MAR 2 9 2005 
Layton District Court 
D. MICHAEL NIELSEN (#3668) 
Attorney for Respondent 
Sessions Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)292-1818 
Telefax: (801)292-2525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIL i COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN E. RILEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DONNA L. RILEY, 
F ; 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS O^ T AW 
Civil No. 034701108 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came en fn ira! in the above-entitled Coiirt, before Honorable Thomas I 
Kay, District Cnw- Imkv. m Monday lanuary ?4, 2005, 
RICHARDS. ( \ l \ i A ALLEN. Respondent was pre,cut .me represented b\ ouuse 
Michael Nielsen. 
I lie Com I having c \ . * : * . • : - ..t .; 
fully considered the arguments ei eowoel, the testimony ef ihe parties and the exhibits 
submitted by ! parties, and beine fully advised in the case, now hereby 11lakes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Tin \ mill " « p.lilies Hid 111« ii mi rsperlf', I" I UIIIIM'I Im (lie 
professional manner exhibifeo •;- ;:,is case. The Court appreciates the fact that the parties 
Findinas of fact and conclusions of law 
were not vindictive with each other in Court, and that the case was professionally handled on 
both sides. 
2. The Court is called upon to make a ruling on important issues. In deciding 
these issues, the Court relies heavily upon its perceptions of credibility. This case turns on 
credibility issues - the credibility of the parties themselves. The Court's findings regarding 
credibility issues are as follows: 
a. The Court finds it both refreshing and more credible when a witness is asked a 
question that's not going to put them in a good light, or could easily be denied 
or argued about, and frankly admits what the cross-examiner is telling her. 
b. Mrs. Riley was more credible in that respect. She admitted things that should 
have been admitted. She basically seemed credible as she testified. 
c. Unlike Mrs. Riley, Mr. Riley was unwilling to admit facts which should have 
been admitted under cross-examination. 
d. When asked to admit that he had fathered a second child out of wedlock, Mr. 
Riley denied the same but stated on cross-examination that he had put the 
child as an insured on his insurance policy. So, the Court comes to the 
conclusion that either Mr. Riley has fathered a second child out of wedlock, or 
he has defrauded an insurance company. 
e. Mr. Riley also testified that he signed an Affidavit to purchase his home in 
Houston, stating that he was single, when he wasn't. Now, he could justify 
that, because the trial got continued or something else, but the fact of the 
matter is that when somebody signs an affidavit, and it is under oath, and it is 
a lie, that person has, basically, perjured themselves. And, signing an affidavit 
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to get a home, saying you were single when., you weren't, wasn't a tn le 
statement.. 
3. Hi- " sin U he i i nsuleie ' " ''M M i,il TL ' ' '«) |i !' ilni1 i III- p» hul 
order. They related to alimony, retirement, what was called property distribution, which was 
refined to say back pay, debt allocation and attorney's fees. Those are the issues that were 
set foi trial. In deciding those issues, 1:., *.\ .. . . , .ic*; .,> 1 ipon its assessment of 
credibility Mr the reasons thai arc set lon1; ilv\ 
4. : • 1: 1 1,01 e ti lai 1.1 lii i.et> (90) days 
prior to the filing of this action. 
1
 s p trtu s are husband and wife, having been married on the 1st day of 
1 '"' ;:!:bl I : • - ' v - « . 
1 'KM IM\ c heci. ;*• . hildren as issue of these parties. Custody, visitation, 
child support and other • v e ^ are not before the Court. 
;n^. **: ::.- . carriage, both parties were residing in .\,a.sK.. >*\-1 were 
employed on a full-time basis. Mr. Riley was engaged in li1 M? ?r.ilitar\ service for ihe 
\\ Males Anm Me \\t\s ;i piolessioiiiil immi I.III 1111 lln s • .-.-.s 
employed :n the Alaska State Di\ is ion of Social Services. 
8 •••: ipproximately March, 1992, Mr. Riley's employment with the I 'mted 
States \ n 1: 13 r ceased I II: 1 z partie s I: ia\ e pi esei iteci, coi lflictii ig & idei ice as t o tl: 
tl lis cessation of employmei it. 11 i,e Court fn ids that regardless of the purpose and 'eason lor 
the cessation ol employment, Mr. 1< '•"* has greatly benefitted v\ s jvrsi - \\ haopiness and 
h- > v ;i?ver oppor' . . , ;
 lVi , _ r; >ng a commercial \nh^ 1 1 le Court, 
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finds that Mr. Riley was unhappy in the military and that the family made a plan for him to 
leave the military, receive further education and training and pursue a career of his choosing. 
9. In 1994, the parties moved from Alaska to Utah. The major reason for the 
move was so that Mr. Riley could pursue aviation training in his goal to pursue a career as a 
commercial pilot. Mrs. Riley continued to work in the area of child and family services, 
employed by the State of Utah. 
10. The Court finds that the plan the family put into effect provided for Mr. 
Riley's training and employment in his chosen career of aviation. Mrs. Riley has referred to 
this plan as pursuing Mr. Riley's "dream career", a phrase which seems applicable. 
11. Mr. Riley attended Salt Lake Community College, then Westminster College, 
receiving his degree in August, 1997. All during that time, Mrs. Riley continued to work 
for the State of Utah 
12. In order to facilitate Mr. Riley's education, training and instruction, Mrs. 
Riley's pre-marital assets were liquidated and the funds used for family expenses. These 
assets included retirement accounts and pension funds which accumulated through Mrs. 
Riley's employment with the State of Alaska prior to the marriage. 
13. Respondent's Exhibit "2" indicates the amounts of money that were taken out. 
From the testimony and exhibits, the Court finds that had these funds been left in the 
retirement/pension accounts and not withdrawn, the value today would be $124,012.91. 
14. Mr. Riley testified that had he continued in the military for an additional 4 to 
4 V2 years, he could have retired and been paid approximately $1,000.00 per month for the 
past 9 years, or approximately $100,000.00. 
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The Court also notes the disparity in the respective incomes of the parties over 
the years of the marriage. Respondent's Exhibit "6" si icm s tl: lat fs It: s R ilej eai ned 
$502,645.00 while !\ Ir Riley eai i led $205,688.00, pli is $22,500.00 from his VA Stipend 
benefit A ccordingly, the Court finds that during the length of the marriage, Mrs. Riley 
Fhe plan the family put into effect succeeded i * \\c\ attained his goal and 
• • mnvntly employed as a captain by Continental Express Airlines, a subsidiary of 
A irlii ies 
1 7
 : Is to Mr. Riley's income, the Court finds: 
a. His i ate of pa.) $66 40 pei 1 IOI ii: v « it'll: I a gi larai itee of 75 1 IOI zrs pei n IC it itl: i, 
resulting in a guaranteed base monthly income of $4,980.00 gross 
111 Kile\ lesiified that he has been ahlr w« ^M-L
 ;j. *\eess o* h^ ~"-; **>r 
i i lii lii :ii mi n i i at id expe cts to be able tc • • io sc ii 11:1 le fi lti n e I lis expected gross 
taxable income for 2005 is $6,232.00 per month. 
c. In addition, Mr. Riley receives per diem in the amount of $300.00 to $400.00. 
d. i ....: •. Vermont1 , , --_ iity pay . 
e. The Court realizes that Mr. j*iie\ d a u m ih.:: m^ iv diem income is utilized 
for ' • • i •--.! -W'Ur 'hat ir. !:• ' \ i v r ; , • '• inns %SlUI (III is Ioi food, 
stating tnai 1A. eats , ,.; .. ;•• ;c a i s - u ^ a n ^ *NJSU.<) } for entertainment. 
Having noted that, the Court finds that Mr. Riley's gross monthly income, 
• ' (in ill ill III 1,1 -ill! -!• uu a p p n m d i r s % ' (HUM 111,11. 
f. Considering ail o: ihe above, the Court makes a finding that Mr. Riley's gross 
monthly income IJ $6,800.00. 
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18. As to Mrs. Riley's income, the Court finds: 
a. She is employed as a Program Manager with the Department of Human 
Services, State of Utah. 
b. Her hourly rate is $23.96, resulting in monthly earnings of $4,153.00. 
c. In addition, Mrs. Riley occasionally performs outside contract services as 
privately retained. Her income is minimal, however, from this source. Her 
tax records evidence a loss every year except 2003, when she earned the sum 
of $878.00. 
19. In summarizing the parties respective careers and incomes, the Court finds 
that great disparity exists: 
a. Mr. Riley earns $6,800.00 per month through his employment as an airline 
pilot and his VA disability pay. 
b. Mrs. Riley earns $4,153.00 per month with her employment with the State of 
Utah. 
c. The testimony indicates that Mrs. Riley may have some outside sources of 
income beyond her job, but her ability to meet her expenses at the present time 
is limited to her monthly income of $4,153.00 through the State. 
20. As stated by Mr. Riley in his trial brief, the Court must consider three factors 
in determining alimony to wit: the financial condition and needs of the Mrs. Riley, the 
ability of Mrs. Riley to produce a sufficient income for herself, and the ability of Mr. Riley 
to provide support. The Court finds as follows: 
a. Mrs. Riley's exhibit sets forth her expenses as $4,491.00 per month. 
b. As discussed above, her present ability to meet those needs is $4,153.00. 
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c Mr. Riley's exhibit sets forth his expenses as $4,655.00. As noted above, the 
, $750.00 of that. 
d * RiLv \, L-hbs IIK wiik of $6,800.00, subtracting his 
monthly expenses still leaves over $2,000.00, giving him the ability to assist 
M i s R l i e > • ' . •' 
e fhe Court also finds that Mr. Riley's ability to contribute is actually higher 
than indicated, because the * '-MMI believes that some <•>* !-•• : uvicA -\nenses 
are in .-• : ,;.icn .:.- ' entertainment and some other items that aie * asj.-cl 
incidentals, k>i whatever else. 
• f. ri: i i Coi ii 1:1: las taken ii lto ' act tl lat I\ It , R • • I 
"crash pad" housing paymen .,v .i ,165.00 house payment an increase of 
approximately $900.00. The Court still feels that Mr. Riley has sufficient 
I" Ii i > R Lie) 
g u n tnc i on;' finds that Mrs. Riley has needs and that Mr. Rile) has the 
ability to pro"\ ide assistance. 
I I i t Coi n t notes tl lat tl lese figures i. ; * , ;.K CK->^ incomes of both parties, withoi it 
deduction for taxes, I Iowe\ ei. nw i * u*r \i ven consistent in i utilizing gross incomes for 
both parties. 
1 1 le Coin t is also going to place emphasis oi I tl le issi le of fault, as recognized 
and permitted by the legislature in I JCA 30-3-5(8)(b), the provisions of u Inch are set forth 
belo\ i ' Ii i ei iterii ig its fit iciii ig tl tat f ai ill: pla;; s a pai I; ii i tl le C :>i it t's : • . Coi it I: is 
persuaded by the following: 
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a. The Court finds that during the course of the marriage, Mr. Riley committed 
adultery and fathered a child in the State of Texas. 
b. Mr. Riley kept this fact hidden from Mrs. Riley for nearly two (2) years. 
During that period of time, Mr. Riley paid sums of money to the child's 
mother, without Mrs. Riley's knowledge. 
c. Mrs. Riley found out about Mr. Riley's adultery and the child nearly two (2) 
years after the affair, when, in opening mail at the family residence in 
Kaysville, she discovered a Summons and Order from the State of Texas 
regarding issues of paternity, child support, etc.. 
d. All of the above constitute grounds of extreme mental anguish and distress, 
caused by Mr. Riley's action in committing adultery and deceitfully covering 
his actions, withholding information while utilizing family funds to pay for the 
child born outside of this marriage. In all of these actions, Mr. Riley made no 
disclosure to Mrs. Riley until he was directly confronted by irrefutable court 
documents. 
e. As previously indicated, it appears that an issue also exists regarding Mr. 
Riley's fathering of a second child outside the marriage. Mr. Riley was 
evasive and deceitful as to that issue as well. 
Based upon the above findings which are established by a preponderance of the evidence in 
this case, and based upon all of the money that Mrs. Riley sacrificed in order to help her 
husband further her career, the Court believes that the evidence shows that this divorce 
would not have taken place, but for the adultery. The fact that the adultery was concealed, 
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the fact that there is a potential for something else, either fraud on an insurance company or 
.'mot!-- • • l » " i l -<<*• •" il\ctu l l i i i l be l ie f . 
i IK- K ourt finds that the facts of this case justify consideration of Mr. Riley's 
fault. The Court deems it necessary to consider that factor in fairness to Mrs. Rilr- *'1 ;t 
it i : it till: ite Coi ill's it iter it to appl) st t: ic t pi it liti • e i t tc ast it: e s so as to t it lfairly ot cqu K. . 
NIr. Riley. Never the less , M r s . Ri ley is entit led to certain rel ief based upon her needs , Mr. 
Riley's abilit\ ;r -, * iauit , the e t ^ n - - * Mi-- l ' i :-- e ••-- ^ - * e 
sacrifice/liquidation ,>! r e r ^ r e - m a n i a ! as.seiN \\\ u.dei M> I ;uu/- i-<-s career opportuni t ies . 
1 n. ( Our! has cons idered the month ly expenses required by each party, as 
• : •* mailable to eacl t par tj 1 1 le C : -\ it 1: alsc • takes it lto accoi it it 1:1 i s f act 
tllat Mr. Riley is u\Aa .-.n Order from the State of Texas to pay child support of $470.00 per 
month fo* •- < ] *-Mhcr witli an additional $156.11 per month for special schooling and 
speei hi ibnapy. 
'
f
 determining issues of dh ision "marital property, debt, alimony and 
a u u m o \ s toes, tl • ..*,: j - • > • 
•-•
;
- r\ 8H v * - . • ..;aies 
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts 
of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property 
and in determining the amount of alimony. If one's spouse earnings 
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the Court may make a compensation adjustment 
in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
b. S , : »
 u ^ . as .i nctor: 
whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase 
in the payor spouses skill by paying for education received by 
the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school 
during the marriage. 
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c. UCA 30-3-5(8)(b) which provides that the Court "may consider the fault of 
the parties in determining alimony." 
d. UCA 30-3-5(8)(a), setting forth the usual and customary factors of needs, 
ability to produce income, ability to contribute, length of the marriage, etc.. 
25. Mr. Riley is ordered to pay to Mrs. Riley alimony in the amount of $900.00 
per month, commencing with the month of February, 2005 and continuing thereafter for a 
period of time not to exceed the duration of the marriage. This award of alimony shall 
terminate upon the earliest of any of the following events: 
a. The death of either party; 
b. Mrs. Riley's remarriage or co-habitation in a spousal role; 
c. At such time as the length of the alimony award exceeds the length of the 
marriage which is 156 months (2/92 through 2/05). 
Payment shall be made by automatic withdrawal from Mr. Riley's primary employment. 
Mr. Riley shall make appropriate arrangements with his employer for the transfer of funds, 
one-half (/4) on the first (1st) and one-half (14) on the sixteenth (16th) of each month to Mrs. 
Riley's checking account. 
26. Mr. Riley is ordered to maintain his current life insurance policy in full force 
and effect for the term of the alimony, with Mrs. Riley named as beneficiary, so that she can 
be protected. It would be appropriate for evidence of the life insurance coverage and 
information about the policy to be provided to counsel D. Michael Nielsen on a yearly basis. 
Mr. Riley can provide that information on or before April 15th of each year, commencing 
with the present year. 
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27 o defined contribution retirement assets, the Court order» f.\\\\ 
be awarded . - ! I f l l l l I h r r ml "in\ « l a i n i In Hie n l h r i ( III c o u ^ e
 t: e ^ * • * ) 
assets u.c subject to me loaiis that each party has made on his/her specific 401 (k). 
•* io Mrs. Riley's defined contribution retirement . • .*,..._• 
, a1! : «- :fn led coi lti ibi ltioi l • ": s , . .ar ^.iim i \ h Rtley. based upon 
the amouir I mone\ she gave up through conversion of her earlier retirement assets in order 
to benefit the b^# \ the fam \\ . * : -1- : >• * •; ti ibi ition 
le ic > m .^e i s i.,;. iigli Ihk SI.,.^ . ; . .,.*.. . .ii L, i >c divided pursuant to the Woodward 
formula. 
29. ' u_ e ^ s:v , . i. , parties' residence, the 
parties each m\e .t i additional amount of approximately $28,000.00 to the holder cv iht- first 
and second mortgage which was applicable to the residen. 
cl langes ii it! i . uitie* ownt\; a., \u<. , Mo a parties are SILK • \* 
the debts resulting from sale. 
3d 1 he Court recognizes thai as pail of Mi \(\U \ i IHII'I.H, I negotiations as a pilot 
illnental Express Air, he has received an amount of "back wages" or "back-pay,f. 
1 he Court Iruls that both parties are equalK entitled to those amounts. Mr. Rile> has 
testified *li;i? afiei * \KH I \va(t»es" was approximately 
^ ' u .hn, -,»a> * »ih -hio: \ » oi that amount to Mrs. Riley as follows: 
a. For tae oe\i tuenK -four (24) months, ^ !?-" \ a j : • -s 
c ' ayments sua; . \u.nu *\ dirca depos ; i*« Mrs. 
Riley's checking account. Payment shall be made b> ilie last day of each 
month. 
b. At the conclusion of the twenty-four (24) months, the remaining obligation of 
$2,700.00 shall be paid in full. 
c. So long as Mr. Riley pays these obligations in a timely fashion, as outlined 
herein, no interest shall accumulate on the principal amount of $5,100.00. 
d. If payments are not made in a timely fashion, however, Mrs. Riley may seek 
judgment by filing an affidavit, providing notice to Mr. Riley and/or his 
counsel and requesting that the Court issue judgment for the entire amount, 
together with interest, less payments actually made to date. 
e. In the event that judgment is entered, that judgment may be augmented by 
reasonable costs of collection as provided by statute. 
f. Nothing herein shall preclude or prevent Mr. Riley from paying the entire 
amount earlier than required. 
g. This obligation is recognized as a non-alimony, non-taxable payment. 
31. As to the issue of attorneys fees, the Court notes that attorneys fees are, 
basically, discretionary with the Court. The Court agrees with the argument of Mr. Riley's 
counsel that there must be a showing of need and a showing of ability to pay. In this case, it 
is also interesting to note that the Court specifically believes that Mrs. Riley would not have 
incurred any attorneys fees had there not been the adultery. The Court also takes into 
account the fact that Mr. Riley does not have the immediate ability to pay attorneys fees. 
Because of his alimony obligation, he will not be able to simply write out a significant check 
for attorneys fees. Having taken all of that into account, the Court also notes that Mrs. Riley 
has written out a lot of checks to benefit Mr. Riley. The Court notes what Mr. Riley has 
accomplished in his career. He was greatly benefitted, both by the VA and Mrs. Riley. 
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32 Tak ing all of those things into account , the Cour t is not going to order the 
requested aim-!1 ,' • ' 1 Ml ' , i n l"» ! hi- < Hi"1 !•• y^nny In «\ >n «iu"' M„ l!ik^ p,i> 1 '!l!,""< HO 
« : if N Irs. Riley's a t torneys fee, wl rich is less than one-half (!/2). T h e Cour t finds that Mr . Ri ley 
has an ability to pay those fees as M-I l.n IP • • mult iple findings here in . T h e Cour t also 
believes tl lat ]\ lit: s R ilej is ii I :t lee . * , as set foi 1:1 I ii I it i: n iltiple f h idii igs 1 1 ic < 
also believes that, combined with the fault in this case, issues of attorneys fees, and other 
issues would not have arisen and had to been dealt with but for Mr. Riley's fault. He shall 
pay c • !^ : ! ; - • *. .- KI . , \ a,-. :..n, ws: 
•M the next eighteen (18) months, Mr. Riley >n iii -ake monthly payment of 
$100 i •- - I ' 
Riley's checking account. Payment shall be made b\ me iasi da} oi each 
month. 
b . . . , . . i ^ i 
$2,600.00 shall be paid in full. 
c. bo ion; as Mr. R lie) • pays these obligations in a t - 1 i-J • ; 
herein, i 10 interest shall accumula te on the princh\» inu'iui . i ^5 ,000.00 . 
«' If p a y m e n t s are not made ii i a t imely fashioi i, h o w l e r . Mrs Rile\ i a\ seek 
j u d g m e n t by f ilii i,g an affidavit, p r o \ idii lg it lotic e • < ' 
coiiiisel and reques t ing that ike < nun issue judgment for the entire amount , 
together with interest, less paymen t s actually w\.uU ' » date . 
e. Ii 11:1 le ^ 21 it tl 12 * • " ;I * * it is ei itei ed. tl lat • -jznici. •. • 
reasonable costs <M coliectioi 1. as provided by statute. 
• i j -
f. Nothing herein shall preclude or prevent Mr. Riley from paying the entire 
amount earlier than required. 
g. This obligation is recognized as a non-alimony, non-taxable payment. 
33. All remaining debts and obligations shall be paid by the party incurring them. 
34. In assigning debts and obligations, the Court orders that each party indemnify, 
defend and hold the other party harmless from the obligations assigned to him/her. These 
debts shall be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to Section 523(a)(15) of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. Further, these obligations are recognized as being in the nature of 
support such that they shall be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
35. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party such 
other documentation as is required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce 
entered in this matter. 
36. Mrs. Riley may be restored to her former name of Donna Louise Russell. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and all property incident to this 
marriage. 
2. Respondent should be awarded a Decree of Divorce against Petitioner based 
upon the grounds of Petitioner's adultery as set forth above. The Decree shall become final 
upon signing and entry. 
3. The final Decree of Divorce shall be drafted in strict accordance with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, set forth above. 
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DATED this ? M day of March, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
SECOND DISTRIi 
S L. KAY 
COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Q day of March, 2005,1 caused a true and correct 
•.:.. loregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be, \ ^ 
mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] hand-delivered, 
[ ] sent via facsimile to: 
Dee W. Smith 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, P.C. 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telefax No.: (801) 399-4194 
% S K . K . U 
MAR 2 9 2005 
Layton District Court 
.iCHAEL NIELSEN (#3668) 
.lOrney for Respondent 
Sessions Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)292-1818 
Telefax: (801)292-2525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN V \<\\ n 
Petitioner, 
vs 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
( i v i \ V or17011 OK 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
'•)•- ' na t te r t\>»nt ' ^ f t ' • ,il >ove -ni l if in I ( " i, tin I, he I ore Honorable 1 horaas I 
K.- ; - ..IL. •. . Vionday, January 24,2005. 
Petitionei V J - piesent i-.-iJ represented *^  eo.n-* >! ]h w. ;>;• 
RICHARD^ LAlNb \ - • sponde .. • .; ..-• ; represents; lu ^•uiisc. ; 
Mn IK: '«.,.^en. 
The Court having considered the testimom ^ l^ ih r *. , ,ng 
fully considered lli iri'uim MI«. i uuiir. ..**;,i.i- >> n\c parties : ui ;*ie exhibits 
submitted by both parties, and being familial i "the papers mil ^leadings on file herein, and 
having previously entered its FINDINGS Ul tA( - -. >; now 
tlieivloii,1 makes and1 i, nlei •» il . 
Decree of Divorce 
JD18380840 
034701108 RILEY.DONNA L 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Court commends the parties and their respective Counsel for the professional 
manner exhibited in this case. The Court appreciates the fact that the parties were not vindictive 
with each other in Court, and that the case was professionally handled on both sides. 
2. The parties were residents of Davis County for more than ninety (90) days prior 
to the filing of this action. 
3. The parties are husband and wife, having been married on the 1st day of 
February, 1992 in the State of Alaska. 
4. There have been no children as issue of these parties. Custody, visitation, child 
support and other such issues are not before the Court. 
5. Mr. Riley is ordered to pay to Mrs. Riley alimony in the amount of $900.00 per 
month, commencing with the month of February, 2005 and continuing thereafter for a period 
of time not to exceed the duration of the marriage. This award of alimony shall terminate upon 
the earliest of any of the following events: 
a. The death of either party; 
b. Mrs. Riley's remarriage or co-habitation in a spousal role; 
c. At such time as the length of the alimony award exceeds the length of the 
marriage which is 156 months (2/92 through 2/05). 
Payment shall be made by automatic withdrawal from Mr. Riley's primary employment. Mr. 
Riley shall make appropriate arrangements with his employer for the transfer of funds, one-half 
(l/2) on the first (1st) and one-half i}A) on the sixteenth (16th) of each month to Mrs. Riley's 
checking account. 
-2-
8 Mr. Riley is ordered to maintain his current life insurance policy in full force and 
protected. Evidence of the life insurance coverage and information about the policy shall be 
provided to coin isel D Michael Nielsen on a yearl) basis I lit R ile) cai i pi ovide that 
information on or "before April 15tl 1 of each >< ear, commencing with the present year. 
9. As to defined contribution retirement assets, the Court orders that each party be 
a1 \ * ! '!! • 1: lei c :I" - i I 1 0 1 ( k ) fit: e e of ai i/; claii i I b;y 1:1: le oil: lei Of coit irse,. these 401(k) assets are 
subjec u) \ ie loans that each party has made on his/her specific 401(k). 
A s (o M is Riley's defined contribution retirement assets, the Court hereby awards 
he ( ourt recognizes that as ,i result u\ the sale <• the paiiies res \ ien te *; . 
parties™ n-< ; J / ^ :
 : \ $28,000 
second mortgage which was applicable to the residence. :.e * «• ^ !: r iake no changes in 
that debt allocation. Both parties owned the home. Each party shall continue to pay his/her debt 
- , r i » 
• lie ( ourt has recognized that as part of Mi R ile> fs contract negotiations as a 
pilot with Continental Express A ir, he has received an amount of "back wages" or "back-pay". 
shall be made as follows: 
a. Foi: the next twenty four (24) i nontl is, » < .< 
of $100 00 per i: i: IOI it! i I I: lose payments shall be made by dncU dc\^ ;it ir \ i > . 
Riley's checking accoiint. Payment shall be made by the last day of each month. 
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b. At the conclusion of the twenty-four (24) months, the remaining obligation of 
$2,700.00 shall be paid in full. 
c. So long as Mr. Riley pays these obligations in a timely fashion, as outlined 
herein, no interest shall accumulate on the principal amount of $5,100.00. 
d. If payments are not made in a timely fashion, however, Mrs. Riley may seek 
judgment by filing an affidavit, providing notice to Mr. Riley and/or his counsel 
and requesting that the Court issue judgment for the entire amount, together with 
interest, less payments actually made to date. 
e. In the event that judgment is entered, that judgment may be augmented by 
reasonable costs of collection as provided by statute. 
f. Nothing herein shall preclude or prevent Mr. Riley from paying the entire amount 
earlier than required. 
g. This obligation is recognized as a non-alimony, non-taxable payment. 
13. Mr. Riley is ordered to pay the sum of $5,000.00 to Mrs. Riley as a contribution 
toward her attorneys fees. Payment shall be made as follows: 
a. For the next eighteen (18) months, Mr. Riley shall make monthly payments of 
$100.00 per month. Those payments shall be made by direct deposit to Mrs. 
Riley's checking account. Payment shall be made by the last day of each month. 
b. At the conclusion of the eighteen (18) months, the remaining obligation of 
$2,600.00 shall be paid in full. 
c. So long as Mr. Riley pays these obligations in a timely fashion, as outlined 
herein, no interest shall accumulate on the principal amount of $5,000.00. 
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d. If payments are not made in a timely fashion, however, Mrs. Riley may seek 
judgment by filing an affidavit, providing notice to Mr. Riley and/or his counsel 
and requesting that the Court issue judgment for the entire amount, together with 
interest, less payments actually made to date. 
e. In the event that judgment is entered, that judgment may be augmented by 
reasonable costs of collection as provided by statute. 
f. Nothing herein shall preclude or prevent Mr. Riley from paying the entire amount 
earlier than required. 
g. This obligation is recognized as a non-alimony, non-taxable payment. 
14. All remaining debts and obligations shall be paid by the party incurring them. 
15. The Court orders that each party indemnify, defend and hold the other party 
harmless from the obligations assigned to him/her. These debts shall be non-dischargeable in 
bankruptcy pursuant to Section 523(a)(15) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Further, these 
obligations are recognized as being in the nature of support such that they shall be non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
16. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other party such other 
documentation as is required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered in 
this matter. 
17. Mrs. Riley is hereby restored to her former name of Donna Louise Russell. 
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DATED this ^ &y of March, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
(JRAE HONQ BL] 
SECOND DISTRI 
S L. KAY 
OURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3> day of March, 2005,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to be, pfmailed, postage prepaid, [ ] hand-
delivered, [ ] sent via facsimile to: 
Dee W.Smith 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, P.C. 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telefax No.: (801)399-4194 
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